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On 29 November 2014, Taiwan held the largest series of local electionsin its history, in a nine-in-one format combining polls for 11,130 po-sitions, ranging from mayors of municipalities and cities
(zhixiashi/shizhang 直轄市/市長), county magistrates (xianzhang 縣長), city
and county councillors (shi/xian yihuiyuan 市/縣議會員), township chiefs
(zhenzhang 鎮長, xiangzhang 鄉長), and village and borough chiefs (cunzhang
村長, lizhang 里長), to indigenous district chiefs and councillors (zhixiashi
shandi yuanzhumin quzhang, qumin daibiao 直轄市山地原住民區長，區民
代表). All were elected for four-year terms. Two-and-a-half years into the sec-
ond presidential term of Ma Ying-jeou, the nation-wide elections were seen
as a mid-term test for his administration and a prelude to the next legislative
and presidential elections in early 2016. (1) The big prizes consisted of the six
special municipalities of Taipei, New Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and,
for the first time, Taoyuan. They represent around 70% of Taiwan’s 18.5 million
registered voters, with the other 30% distributed among 16 counties and
cities of smaller size or more rural character.
Before the vote, four municipalities (Taipei, New Taipei, Taichung, and
Taoyuan) and 12 counties and cities were held by the ruling Kuomintang
(KMT) or its Blue camp allies, with a virtual monopoly over central and
northern Taiwan, and only Ilan on the north-east coast being led by the op-
position Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP mostly ruled in the
south, heading the two municipalities of Tainan and Kaohsiung, along with
Yunlin, Chiayi, and Pingtung counties. Due to media concentration and the
national pre-eminence of the candidates, coverage of the electoral cam-
paigning largely concentrated on the capital Taipei, where KMT candidate
Sean Lien Sheng-wen 連勝文, son of the former prime minister, vice-presi-
dent, and KMT chairman Lien Chan 連戰, opposed the independent candi-
date Ko Wen-je 柯文哲 , a National Taiwan University Hospital surgeon
supported by the DPP; and on the central city of Taichung, where KMT
mayor Jason Hu Chih-chiang 胡志強 attempted to win a fourth term against
DPP legislator Lin Chia-lung 林佳龍. 
The DPP and its Green camp ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU Taiwan
tuanjie lianmeng 台灣團結聯盟), mainly campaigned on the strength of
local governance – its mayors repeatedly winning top positions based on
popularity and local government quality in public opinion surveys – and on
support for a renewed grass-roots and democratic spirit on the heels of the
Sunflower Movement of last spring. But it also surfed on the low approval
rate of Ma and the KMT, rising social and economic inequality, and wide-
spread anger over government corruption and housing prices. In the Blue
camp, the high level of popular discontent toward the KMT administration
and the way the country has been ruled, and the tepid results of its main
policies, including its trumpeted cross-strait economic and political rap-
prochement, left the KMT candidates with few national or local policy
achievements to run with. In many cases, Ma was seen as so politically toxic
that candidates declined to stand with him on a public stage. In a desperate
attempt, Lien Sheng-wen and the KMT tried to nationalise and polarise the
campaign into a classic Blue-Green battle around cross-strait relations and
identity, pushing the “save the Republic of China (ROC)” card to rally deep-
Blue voters and prop up their campaign. It had the mostly opposite result
of showing even more clearly the disconnect between today’s mainstream
national Taiwanese identity and the KMT mainlander old guard such as for-
mer premiers Hau Pei-tsun 郝柏村 and Lien Chan, aggravated by repeated
vulgarities and expression of contempt and racism from the latter toward
native Taiwanese. (2)
Overall election results
Election turnout was 67.59%, well within the average turnout for local
polls since 1997. The results saw a landslide victory for the DPP and the
worst defeat of the KMT in Taiwan election history in terms of both seats
and vote percentage. The DPP won four municipalities (Taichung, Taoyuan,
Tainan, Kaohsiung) and nine cities and counties, including symbolically sig-
nificant victories in long-held KMT circumscriptions. Taichung, Tainan, and
Kaohsiung were won in landslides, while the vote shares received in victories
in Ilan, Changhua, Chiayi County, and Pingtung were the DPP’s best records
ever in local elections there. The DPP kept all its previously held mandates,
incumbent or not, and snatched seven positions formerly controlled by the
KMT. The cherished prize of Taipei was also won by the DPP-supported in-
dependent candidate Ko Wen-je in another landslide, leading to the worst
defeat and humiliation of the KMT in the capital. All that remained in the
KMT camp was New Taipei, the largest municipality in the country surround-
ing Taipei on all sides, but with a razor-thin victory, and the counties of
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1. Legislative elections are usually held in December or January. The Presidential election has been
traditionally held in March, with inauguration in May. In 2012, the legislative and presidential
elections were held together on January 14, for the first time on the same day, according to the
wishes of Ma and the KMT, who saw it as favorable to their chances of success. It created a four-
month time gap between the presidential election and the inauguration, leading to heavy criticism
and worries about the legitimacy of a possible lame-duck seated president during that time, a
problem that was eventually avoided with the reelection of Ma. In 2016, the two elections will
also be combined with the date yet to be announced. Cf. "Combined legislative, presidential elec-
tions to take place in 2016: CEC", Central News Agency, 12 February 2015. About the 2012 elec-
tions, cf. Tanguy Le Pesant, “A New Generation of Taiwanese at the Ballot Box: Young voters and
the presidential election of January 2012,” China Perspectives, 2012/2, pp. 71-79.
2. Alison Hsiao, “Ethnic discrimination seen in KMT attacks,” Taipei Times, 21 November 2014.
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Hsinchu, Miaoli, Nantou, Taitung, and Lienchiang (Matsu). The KMT’s victo-
ries were narrow, and incumbents were defeated in Taoyuan, Taichung,
Hsinchu City, Kinmen, and Matsu. Two other Blue-camp independent can-
didates won in Hualien and Kinmen counties. 
The extent of the KMT debacle and the DPP success went beyond both
camps’ expectations and was a surprise to most analysts. Overall, the KMT
scored only 40.70% (4,990,677 votes), its lowest ever nationwide result,
which rises to 43.89% (5,381,874 votes) if adding in other Blue-camp
parties (New Party Xindang 新黨, People First Party Qinmindang 親民黨)
and Blue-leaning independent candidates. For the DPP, this poll marks one
of its best records in local elections, with 47.55% (5,830,106 votes) and
an increase of 490,000 ballots in the five municipalities besides Taipei.
This number underestimates DPP support, as it excludes Green-camp
leaning or supported candidates such as Ko in Taipei. A more realistic fig-
ure would add, not the full count of Ko’s votes, but at least the number
of votes of the DPP candidate in the 2010 Taipei elections, (3) resulting in
a total of 52.67% (6,458,235 votes), a 4.5% rise since the last local elec-
tion cycle. It does not include Green party dissidents, and could thus be
seen as a minimum if virtual number. As such, it is the highest level of
electoral support ever achieved by the DPP in countrywide elections, and
the first time since the 2004 presidential re-election of Chen Shui-bian
that the party gained an absolute majority.
A look at the new electoral map gives interesting insights into the current
political landscape. The DPP-ruled circumscriptions represent more than
60% of the Taiwanese population (more if counting Taipei). The party not
only controls four of the six municipalities (see below) where the majority
of the urban population and enterprises are concentrated, but also totally
dominates the south and centre of the country from Pingtung to Taichung,
while reappearing as an important player in the north. Victories in the south
were expected, although not with such large shares of the vote, including
in Chiayi City, where the young female KMT candidate looked for a while
as if she would be able to keep the mayoralty in the Blue camp. In Hsinchu,
the DPP candidate was in a three-way race and barely won with less than
40%, even though an independent candidate and former DPP mayor took
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Total Seats 13 6 3
Total % 47.55 40.70 11.70
Six municipalities
Taipei City Ind. * Ko Wen-je --- 40.82 57.16
New Taipei City KMT Eric Chu Li-luan 48.78 50.06 1.16
Taoyuan City DPP * Cheng Wen-tsang 51.00 47.97 1.03
Taichung City DPP * Lin Chia-lung 57.06 42.94 ---
Tainan City DPP William Lai Ching-te 72.90 27.10 ---
Kaohsiung City DPP Chen Chu 68.09 30.89 1.02
Cities and counties
Keelung City DPP * Lin Yu-chang 53.15 27.47 19.37
Yilan County DPP Lin Tsung-hsien 63.95 36.05
Hsinchu City DPP * Lin Chih-cien 38.36 37.85 23.77
Hsinchu County KMT Chiu Ching-chun --- 46.94 44.82
Miaoli County KMT Hsu Yao-chang 28.37 46.59 25.03
Changhua County DPP * Wei Ming-ku 53.71 39.58 6.70
Nantou County KMT Lin Ming-chen 49.04 50.96 ---
Yunlin County DPP Lee Chin-yung 56.98 43.02 ---
Chiayi City DPP * Twu Shiing-jer 51.41 45.50 3.07
Chiayi County DPP Helen Chang Hua-kuan 63.09 34.09 2.82
Pingtung County DPP Pan Meng-an 62.93 37.07 ---
Hualien County Ind. Fu Kun-chi --- 27.62 56.53
Taitung County KMT Justin Huang Chien-ting 45.59 54.41 15.85
Penghu County DPP * Chen Kuang-fu 55.34 44.66 ---
Kinmen County Ind.* Chen Fu-hai --- 33.35 52.77
Lienchiang County KMT Liu Tsen-ying --- 33.75 66.25 (KMT)
Table 1 – Results of Mayoral and County Magistrate Elections, November 2014
* Formerly held and lost by KMT.  / Source: Central Election Commission.
Percentage of Votes 
away some Green votes. In Keelung, the DPP was facing a split KMT and
won partly on citizens’ fatigue and disgust with corruption-tainted past
KMT administrations, but still with a solid 53% of the votes. The win in
Penghu was an impressive victory for the DPP, with over 55% of the vote,
but came after a continuous rise in DPP support in local and national elec-
tions, and in a year marked by a national political wave that made it ripe
for the picking. DPP’s party unity, good choice of candidates, and campaigns
focused on local needs and good governance helped the party to expand
its control north of Yunlin and for the first time to most of the central region
of the country with decisive wins in Changhua and Taichung. Only Nantou,
the home county of vice-president Wu Dun-yi, narrowly escaped the Green
wave.
All that was left to the Kuomintang, with the exception of New Taipei,
were the tiny outlying islands facing China’s Fujian Province, and mostly
rural and mountainous counties with smaller service and industrial sectors
and an older and less active population. These locales are also characterised
by a high number of Hakka, Aborigines, and concentrated waisheng com-
munities. This voting pattern was replicated in Hualien, ruled by former PFP
Fu Kun-chi 傅崐萁, as well as more locally in Taoyuan and New Taipei dis-
tricts, or even in Tainan and Kaohsiung, where Hakka (less in the south) and
waisheng groups increasingly constitute the main support of the KMT, to-
gether with older generations of civil servants of all backgrounds and Abo-
rigines everywhere. This has also been true for Taipei in all previous KMT-DPP
battles, but this time the presence of a non-DPP candidate and the inferior
campaign by the KMT led to a reshuffling of voting groups and behaviour. 
Results in the six municipalities 
Detailed analysis of the results in the six municipalities shows marked
changes in the fortunes of the two camps since the last local polls (see Table
2). In Taipei, with a similar turnout as in 2010 and a slightly bigger elec-
torate, the KMT’s dismal performance in vote share and numbers constitutes
its lowest ever result. It indicates problems going beyond the anti-govern-
ment national electoral trend and linked to a badly prepared and inexperi-
enced KMT “princeling” candidate, who ran a polarising, backward-leaning,
nasty, and gaffe-prone campaign. (4) Conversely, Ko Wen-je’s winning per-
centage and total number of votes are the second highest recorded in Taipei
election history, inferior only to Ma’s 2002 mayoral re-election against a
weak DPP candidate. It is also much higher than the best DPP score (Chen
Shui-bian’s 1998 re-election defeat), breaking the 700,000 vote ceiling for
non-KMT candidates in Taipei for the first time, and leading to an across-
the-board victory in all municipal districts, including those most associated
with the KMT’s traditional supporter groups of Mainlanders (waishengren
外省人) and civil servants, a historic and unique feat. Ko’s winning coalition,
while based on DPP electors who overwhelmingly supported him, went
clearly beyond the Green camp to include centrist, younger, and formerly
disenfranchised voters attracted by his rejection of partisan polarisation, as
well as Blue voters disappointed by both Ma’s national policies and the can-
didacy of Lien Sheng-wen. For the KMT, with a candidate and a campaign
described as the worst ever, the sole consolation may be to see that its bot-
tom level is around 610,000 votes, still high enough to build on and give
hope of winning in a more favourable environment.
In New Taipei, the biggest surprises were the big drop in turnout and a
very narrow victory for the KMT incumbent candidate and rising star of the
party, Eric Chu Li-luan 朱立倫, who lost many votes compared to 2010,
when he faced DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 in a tied race. A very
limited campaign with no new policy platforms by Chu, combined with his
pre-announced large victory in all the media and opinion polls, may have
worked against higher turnout and support from the Blue camp. But with
the general anti-KMT mood of the electorate, these numbers may also have
been close to their maximum for a very popular mayor. It thus showed that
Chu was not immune from the national protest vote against the KMT, but
his personal appeal may have saved him as one of the rare KMT winners,
while any other candidate would have fared worse. Bleak prospects for the
KMT in New Taipei had indeed already forced his decision last spring to run
for re-election for fear that the party would otherwise lose all its northern
mayoral positions, against his apparent desire to run for the 2016 presiden-
tial election. The DPP candidate, former premier Yu Shyi-kun 游錫堃, did
much better than anticipated, but he also garnered fewer votes than Tsai in
2010, and a less depressed turnout or a candidate more appealing to the
younger generation could have helped created another upset, since Tsai’s
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4. Cf. J. Michael Cole, “He Also Drank the Blood of His Patients,” Thinking Taiwan, 21 November 2014,
http://thinking-taiwan.com/he-also-drank-the-blood-of-his-patients/ (accessed on 26 January
2015).



































































































Table 2 – Taiwan 2014 Local Elections Six Municipalities Results
*For Taoyuan, comparison with 2009 local election. / Source: Central Election Commission.
2010 vote numbers would have been enough to beat Chu in 2014.
The election results in Taoyuan were a shock to most, since no poll or pun-
dit had foreseen the defeat of the KMT in an apparently secured circum-
scription headed by the son of KMT old guard Hakka elder Wu Po-hsiung
吳伯雄. Taoyuan had just been upgraded to special municipality level, with
a rising population, a real estate boom, and the economically transformative
Aerotropolis mega project around the international Taoyuan airport. At the
end of the day, John Wu Chih-yang 吳志揚 lost by 3% to DPP candidate
Cheng Wen-tsan 鄭文燦 while still improving the KMT’s vote number. An
unexpected jump in turnout, combined with a successful ground campaign
by Cheng, led to a boost of almost 50% in his ballot numbers. The KMT
trump cards in Taoyuan appeared to have all worked against it, and com-
bined with anger among civil servants and military pensioners over Ma’s
policies toward them (a factor that also played in other municipalities) and
a subtle demographic shift gave the victory to the
DPP. The rise of new residents and voters, many
pushed out of Taipei and New Taipei by sky-high
housing prices, and the extensive land expropria-
tions planned to realise the big business and con-
struction companies’ commercial dream of the
Aerotropolis, combined with the local administra-
tion’s high-handed attitude toward the common
people and its corruption and profiteering scan-
dals worked together to create a large movement
against the KMT candidate’s projects and re-elec-
tion. 
In Taichung, Jason Hu’s re-election chances were
always seen as small, the KMT elder being the city
and then municipality head since 2001 and barely
re-elected in 2010. Beyond a congenial personal-
ity, his job approval rating was low due to few im-
provements in urban life during his mandates,
especially in transportation, and corruption and
security issues in a region known for collusion be-
tween local mafia and politicians. The huge real-
estate development that Hu presided over for
more than ten years has redesigned the city (in-
cluding an architectural gem opera house), but as
in many other places in Taiwan contributed more
to growing income inequality than to the welfare
of local people. In any case, the victory of Lin Chia-
lung was impressive for its depth and width across
the municipality districts, improving the DPP’s
2010 score by more than 8% with a slightly infe-
rior turnout. The Taichung results seemed to indi-
cate a direct shift of support from the KMT to the
DPP, with Lin’s increased vote numbers correspon-
ding almost exactly to the addition of Hu’s losses
and new voters. Hu’s humiliating score, a record
low for the Blue camp in Taichung, likewise indi-
cated the growing gap between the KMT’s privi-
leged older generation of leaders, mostly in their
60s and above, and the rest of the population’s
needs and imagined community, both in cam-
paign priorities and communication.
Mayoral election results in both Tainan and Kaohsiung were largely ex-
pected, the unknown being merely the size of the victories of the DPP’s
incumbent candidates, William Lai Ching-te 賴清德 and Chen Chu 陳菊,
as well as the municipality council election results (see below). Neither
disappointed their supporters in terms of record results. With a smaller
electorate than in Taipei, New Taipei, and Taichung, Chen Chu earned the
highest number of votes in the nation despite a lower turnout. She was
also facing an apparently stronger candidate than Lai in former DPP Kaoh-
siung County governor Yang Chiu-hsing 楊秋興, who joined the KMT after
a failed independent candidacy in 2010. As a result, the KMT increase in
vote share actually hides a larger victory for Chen, who managed to attract
most of Yang’s 2010 voters. In Tainan, Lai did not even need to campaign,
with the KMT candidate merely a figurehead with no platform or
prospects. As in Kaohsiung, a lower turnout did not prevent the DPP can-
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didate from increasing vote share and votes, while the KMT crumbled to
an abysmal 27.10%. Both circumscriptions highlighted the increasing co-
nundrum of the KMT across the south, where the lack of appeal of its eco-
nomic and national identity policies is reinforced by a shrinking pool of
up-and-coming local politicians outside of the old local factions tied to
corruption and scandals.
In terms of turnout, these elections provide very different pictures accord-
ing to each locale. The 70.4% turnout in county and city elections shows a
4.6% rise compared to 2009, (5) probably benefiting from higher media ex-
posure and national mobilisation generated by the merging of all local polls
on the same day. For the six special municipalities, turnout decreased by
3.25%, with sharper drops in New Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Tainan, almost no
change in Taipei, and a rise in Taoyuan. The lower turnout may be explained
by the expected victory of the incumbents in the first three municipalities.
But since both Kaohsiung and Tainan saw the vote numbers of their popular
DPP candidates jump, together with a large increase in DPP votes in Taichung
and Taoyuan, the Green electorate was clearly very enthusiastic about voting
and sending a message to the Ma administration. The main reason for a mod-
erate turnout is thus probably due to higher abstention among Blue voters,
out of either a wish to sanction the KMT or an inability to support its can-
didates.
At the level of city and county councils, the DPP also made marked gains
and for the first time equalled the KMT in terms of percentage, with the
DPP winning 37.08% and the KMT 36.86% of the vote, the rest being shared
by smaller parties and independents. In terms of seats, however, the KMT
still dominates the councils nationwide with 386 seats versus 271 for the
DPP. In the special municipalities, the Green camp was potentially in control
after the council polls in New Taipei, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, while signifi-
cantly raising its councillor numbers in Taipei, Taoyuan, and Taichung. The
election of council chiefs by councillors in early January nevertheless saw
the Blue camp winning in New Taipei and Tainan, leading to new rounds of
bribery accusations against the KMT and judicial investigations. (6) Council
elections also witnessed the first success of candidates from small parties
such as the Green Party (Taiwan lüdang 台灣綠黨), the Tree Party (Shudang
樹黨), and the indigenous peoples’ First Nations Party (Taiwan diyi minzu
dang 台灣第一民族黨).
Finally, in the elections for city mayors and township chiefs, the KMT only
barely maintained its traditional dominance in votes, with 33.71% versus
31.72% for the DPP, winning 80 seats, followed by 68 independent seats,
and 54 DPP seats.
Analysis of the election results
The tremendous defeat of the KMT nationwide and in the most important
contests coincides with a continuous downslide from its past dominance
at the lower rungs of elected positions. In this respect, the DPP certainly
benefited from the low popular support for Ma and his administration, but
the poll results also confirm significant medium-term political shifts and a
protest vote that were not understood by many analysts, and may foretell
more change in future electoral behaviour. This can be assessed by com-
paring these elections with the aggregated results of two former rounds of
local elections in 2005-06 and 2009-10 (see Table 3). In the past ten years,
the DPP vote share has grown almost 10%, with an increase of around 4.5%
per election cycle, from 43.27% in 2005-06, to 48.20% in 2009-10, and to
a virtual minimum of 52.67% in 2014. Meanwhile, the drop in KMT support
has been proportional, the party and its allies losing more than 8% since
2005-06 (52.24% to 45.76% to 43.89%), which should ring alarm bells in
the party, as local dominance is crucial to maintaining national-level elec-
tion success.
Reasons behind the KMT defeat
The reasons behind the KMT election results are diverse but mostly linked
to the domestic situation. The elections remained local contests and did
not imply a direct judgment on cross-strait and international policies. Out-
side factors such as relations with China and the Hong Kong Umbrella
movement did not play substantial roles, even though Hong Kong’s polit-
ical evolution has reinforced the rejection by most Taiwanese of any future
unification with the People’s Republic of China and their long-held view
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5. Number adjusted for the switch of Taoyuan to special municipality level.
6. All together, 167 elected officials have been charged by prosecutors for vote-buying, corruption,
and other electoral crimes in the elections, including the main protagonists in the Tainan and New
Taipei council election scandals. Cf. Jason Pan, “Over 150 officials face charges after Nov. 29 elec-
tions,” Taipei Times, 7 January 2015.
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2005-06 (Combined) 2009-10 (Combined) 2014
Registered voters 16,793,623 17,774,584 18,511,356
Valid votes 10,931,099 11,939,049 12,261,784
Turnout % 66.13 68.15 67.59
DPP (Total estimation Green Camp) % 43.27 48.20 47.55 (52.67)
DPP (Total estimation Green Camp) votes 4,729,819 5,754,891 5,830,106 (6,458,235)
KMT (Total estimation Blue Camp) % 52.24 45.76 40.70 (43.89)
KMT (Total estimation Blue Camp) votes 5,710,486 5,463,570 4,990,677  (5,381,874)
Independents % 4.49 6.03 11.70
Independents votes 490,794 720,192 1,434,851
Table 3 – Taiwan Local Elections Results 2005-2014
Source: Central Election Commission.
of the fallacy of the “One country, Two Systems” (yiguo liangzhi 一國兩制)
policy. But its countrywide nature, its political nationalisation by the KMT,
and the anti-KMT wave clearly gave a national dimension to the poll. It al-
lowed voters to express dissatisfaction toward Ma Ying-jeou’s administration
and policies, including cross-strait policies, and sent a strong message to the
government to readjust its priorities, while the KMT itself has been deeply
split since 2013 by infighting led by the president and his close associates.
The main reproach of the electorate touches on the dismal economic
situation of the majority, and especially of the younger generation, despite
a nominal annual GDP growth of 2%-3% in recent years. Since Ma’s eco-
nomic policies from the start of his first term in 2008 have focused on
China and cross-strait integration, (7) the poll results also carried a strong
rejection of the government’s central economic program. The Sunflower
Movement (taiyanghua yundong 太陽花運動 or 3-18 三一八 movement),
which prevented ratification of the CSSTA (Cross-strait Service Trade Agree-
ment haixia liang’an fuwu maoyi xieyi 海峽兩岸服務貿易協議) signed in
2013, was already a signal to the government that the majority of Tai-
wanese were not benefiting from closer relations with China and feared
even more intrusion from and control by Chinese businesses and political
interests in their lives and the nation’s economy, especially at the small
and medium enterprise level. Economists and official audits have recog-
nised that the ECFA cross-strait agreement (Economic Cooperation Frame-
work Agreement liang’an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi 兩岸經濟合作架構協議),
the prelude to the CSSTA, has not brought much tangible GDP growth or
benefit to most Taiwanese, and often the opposite. (8) Tourist venues flooded
with uncouth Chinese tour groups whose spending benefits mainly Hong
Kong and Chinese tourism companies, compounded by illegal Chinese in-
vestment in residential real estate (9) and overt pro-China propaganda by
KMT-affiliated tycoons and Taishang 台商 (Taiwanese doing business in
China), have provided a disastrous image of the very practical conse-
quences of rapprochement with China.
The government’s self-righteous attitude and police brutality in dealing
with the Sunflower Movement and previous civil and social movements
were also largely disapproved of by public opinion. But criticism of the gov-
ernment did not stop at cross-strait policies. Even more important were the
growing income gap and repeated expressions of incompetence, political
autism, and shoddy work by KMT central and local governments. Across the
country, rising discontent with land speculation, overt corruption or the ap-
pearance of official impropriety and collusion with big business, inadequate
or impotent administration policies, disconnection with and blatant disre-
gard for common people’s needs and lives, including inefficient laws and
lackadaisical monitoring of food safety, industrial accidents, and pollution
threatening everybody’s health and daily life, KMT officials’ sense of enti-
tlement, their rising authoritarian tendencies, the growing politicisation and
partisan use of state institutions (from various ministries and agencies to
police and justice), and deficient or nonexistent social policies have all in-
creasingly fuelled popular rejection of the KMT administration. This all
played out against a background of non-redistributive growth and increasing
economic disparity with decreasing or stagnating low salaries for the ma-
jority, rising prices for basic utilities and food products, exorbitant real-estate
cost and speculation, an unbalanced tax system, and the upper and ruling
classes getting richer in a typical plutocratic configuration. Discontent to-
ward Ma Ying-jeou personally and toward his successive administrations
has thus spread across the political spectrum, even in the Blue camp, and is
very strong among the middle and young voters. (10)
Finally, the defeat of the KMT old guard and pro-China political family can-
didates in Taipei, Taoyuan, and Taichung expressed the electorate’s disaffec-
tion for old-style politics as well as the lack of new blood and grooming of
younger politicians outside the party’s entrenched factions. This contrasts
with the DPP, which has focused much of its effort since losing power in
2008 on local governance, community work, on-the-ground networking, and
training or supporting a new generation of grass-root politicians, including
some involved in the Sunflower and previous social movements. These efforts
seem to have started repaying the party with a much higher number of
elected councillors who are female and under 35 as compared with the KMT.
The Ko Wen-je phenomenon
The victory of the independent candidate Ko Wen-je as Taipei’s mayor was
also a major event of the elections. Ko represents a new phenomenon in Tai-
wan’s political landscape. Criticising the Blue-Green rivalry as sterile, Ko
vowed to free city affairs of political polarisation by picking competent politi-
cians and administrators from both camps, and to run an efficient and trans-
parent government open to public participation. This struck a chord among
the capital’s middle voters and younger generation, who often don’t recog-
nise themselves in the old Blue-Green battles. Ko’s campaign team and the
new city administration have thus been staffed by NP, PFP, and DPP politi-
cians, as well as non-partisan professionals and activists. Considered to hold
deep Green convictions, and coming from a family victimised during the
1947 2-28 incident, Ko focused his message on the future and youth rather
than on the past, and praised PFP leader Soong Chu-yu for his administrative
competence. He also achieved the rare feat of defending Republic of China
sovereignty against “KMT compradors” while challenging the meaning of the
so-called 1992 consensus and keeping a business-as-usual attitude toward
China, where he has frequently travelled and lectured. Run on a shoestring,
the campaign kept a positive tone and made the best use of social media,
activist groups, and free publicity through the mainstream media’s constant
reporting on his contest with Lien. Hard to pigeonhole, his blunt, humorous,
no-nonsense, fact-based, and result-oriented style convinced voters that this
non-conventional candidate could better turn the city to the service of its
residents and straighten out a series of controversial infrastructure and con-
struction projects pursued by previous administrations. In many ways, despite
an authoritarian tendency that has already been criticised, Ko makes other
candidates and politicians look a bit pale, indecisive, and disconnected from
the public pulse, and may provide new standards for future national and local
politicians and campaigns starting in 2016. 
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Poll outcomes 
An immediate aftermath of the KMT defeat was the resignation of premier
Jiang Yih-hua 江宜樺, and then, after heavy public and insider pressure, the
forced resignation of Ma Ying-jeou as party chairman amid promises of re-
form and listening to public views. An almost identical new cabinet under
Mao Chi-kuo 毛治國, another technocrat and close associate of Ma who
pledged to pursue the same policies, immediately belied these engage-
ments. Already deeply unpopular and unable to pass its priority bills in a
KMT-controlled but restive parliament, the government should remain in
caretaker mode until the 2016 national elections. At the party level, the
new chairman, Chu Li-luan, will also have to implement more than super-
ficial changes to convince a suspicious electorate that he is willing and able
to reform a party deeply divided between factions and entrenched interests,
and to regain the trust of the middle voters. The 2016 legislative and pres-
idential elections will be decided on more national issues and policies, with
the China factor looming large, but they are approaching fast, and the evo-
lution of the electorate is not favourable to the KMT.
The November elections seemed indeed to mirror the anti-DPP protest
vote in the 2005 local and 2008 national elections, this time at the expense
of the Kuomintang, and for similar reasons of disillusion and distrust of a
government out of touch with people’s priorities. This time again, economic
voting was preeminent, as well as the rejection of an administration deemed
unresponsive, in questionable alliances with big business, and too intent on
imposing its will and China-centred ideology on the public instead of work-
ing to alleviate the economic plight of the middle and lower classes. 
The polls also attested to the significance of the middle non-partisan vot-
ers, who proved once again that they hold the key to elections in Taiwan.
Their political stands include a dislike for ideological and radical policies,
support for middle-of-the-road positions, social equality, and pro-middle
class policies, and a pragmatic stance on economic measures based on their
results. They like independent, even populist, candidates and avoid ideolog-
ical choices, and when disappointed they may withdraw their support en
masse or use their vote to punish parties and governments. In past years,
the share of self-identified independent voters has tended to grow markedly
in opinion polls, mainly at the expense of the KMT, which has lost the image
of a moderate party that brought Ma to power.
As a consequence, the KMT’s hold on the electorate seems to have been
largely broken. The Blue camp poll results were for the first time below its tra-
ditional base of 45% of the national vote, and opinion polls indicate that it
has lost the middle, urban, educated, and young electorate. The younger gen-
eration seemed to have voted in significant numbers against Ma’s administra-
tion and policies, a worrying sign for the party’s future. The number of
registered voters continues to grow, with an increasing proportion of a younger
generation raised under democracy, and whose political awakening corre-
sponded to the two terms of Ma’s administration, joining the ranks of voters. 
Finally, previous regional elections under a second-term president have
all signalled an electoral shift that was confirmed in the subsequent pres-
idential elections. Barring major changes in the political landscape or failure
to maintain its unity and good local governance, the DPP appears to be in
a favourable position for 2016. Its control of four municipalities and the
centre (Taichung, Changhua) may be crucial to consolidate its local elec-
tions win at the national level. But it will need more palatable platforms
for cross-strait and international policies than in 2012, and must find ways
to respond to the economic worries of the electorate. Both parties’ choice
of presidential candidates, to be decided by primaries in 2015, will also
have a bearing on the outcome in a very personality-focused media cul-
ture, as well as on the direction of Taiwan politics in the rapidly approaching
post-Ma era.
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